Since 1964,
successive Zambian governments have tried in vain to completely erase the
question of Barotseland, from the post-colonial Zambian discourse. On the
contrary, this issue has constantly re-emerged time after time, more so, after
the return of multi-politics in Zambia after 1991. After draconian measures
were employed to obliterate the Barotse issue, the question remains: is it one
of secession or one of self-determination? This paper casts light on Barotseland’s
quest to “liberate” itself from Zambia.
The paper further posits the following questions: is Barotseland not about a people’s legitimate
cause or right to self-determination?
Has it been erroneously interpreted by Zambian politicians and citizens
alike as akin to secession? The former are posed in so far as the historical
narrative and current realities point to a different scenario, which show that Barotseland existed as a country long before
Zambia and Northern Rhodesia, with its own institutions, political systems,
economic activities, national anthem, flag and coat of arms, among others.
Whilst Europe has allowed many “sub-countries” to become independent
nation-states, especially after the fall of the Berlin War in 1989 and the
collapse of the Soviet Union thereafter, with minimal bloodshed, Africa is
extremely nervous about such a prospect. Many African states seem to treat the
boundaries which their colonial masters bequeathed them as sacrosanct. Is this
a realistic stance in the twenty-first century? Can the African post-colonial
state, in its current form - with vast powers vested in presidents and highly
centralised governments in place, which in some cases negate national
development – realistic?
